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A citizen prosecuted for a state crime is subject to a set of
consequences appreciably different than one prosecuted for a federal crime at
every stage, from investigation through sentencing. For a particular
defendant, these consequences are sometimes better, sometimes worse, but
they are nevertheless disparate. A certain amount of disparity is, of course,
inherent in any human system. Whenever possible, however, we should seek
to avoid introducing new sources of disparity without carefully considering
the benefits and costs. In the case of federalization of the criminal law, this
principle has too often been ignored.1
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Civil War, Congress has greatly extended federal
jurisdiction over criminal conduct that previously was the exclusive domain
of the states. 2 Rather than supplant state and local authority to prosecute
crimes in these areas, many federal criminal statutes create concurrent
jurisdiction with states over conduct historically prosecuted by the states.3
Along with expanding federal criminal jurisdiction, Congress standardized
two important aspects of federal criminal law previously lacking national
uniformity. In 1944 and 1946 Congress promulgated the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which formalized and standardized process and
procedure in federal criminal prosecutions.4 In 1984 Congress enacted the
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) to bring national uniformity to federal
sentencing.5 Prior to these enactments, where no federal statute or case law
applied, federal trial court decision-making was guided by judicial discretion
and, in some instances, by state and local practice.6
Federal criminal procedural rules and statutes sometimes provide
less protection to defendants than their state equivalents.7 One example of
this is the federal criminal discovery rules.8 In some jurisdictions, state law
and procedural codes impose much broader discovery obligations on state
prosecutors than those placed on federal prosecutors by the federal rules. 9
Similarly, many state courts have interpreted their states constitutions to
provide criminal defendants more procedural protection than that required
under the federal constitutional “floor” set by the United States Supreme
Court.10 An example of this is certain aspects of search and seizure law, an
area in which some state constitutions provide higher protection against law
enforcement intrusions than the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.11
State constitutional rights and procedural protections, of course, can
only be asserted in state criminal prosecutions. As a result, where a
defendant is prosecuted in federal court for conduct over which both a state
and the federal government have criminal jurisdiction, he or she may be at a
distinct disadvantage simply because of the fortuity or misfortune of having
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/Federalization_of_
Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf.
2
See infra note 22.
3
See infra note 24.
4
See infra notes 62–63.
5
See infra note 28.
6
See infra notes 51–57.
7
See infra notes 67.
8
See infra note 71.
9
See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
10
See infra note 47.
11
See infra text accompanying note 47 (describing States’ approaches to searches
and seizures that were later adopted by the Court).
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attracted the attention of federal prosecutors. 12 And, upon conviction, a
defendant will likely face a drastically harsher sentence than that which a
state court would have imposed for the same conduct. 13 The cumulative
impact, therefore, of Congress’s federalization, nationalization and
standardization of criminal law and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
constitutionalization of criminal procedure has been to create categories of
crimes for which a defendant could be prosecuted both federally and under
state law.14 The level of procedural protection and severity of punishment the
accused receives for the same conduct may vary significantly depending on
which sovereign prosecutes the crime. 15 It is this procedural disparity at
which this article takes aim.
Part II of this article sets out a brief background of the
nationalization, federalization and standardization trend that has
characterized the development of federal criminal law since the Civil War.16
Part III describes the state/federal procedural disparity gap created by the
lower level of criminal procedural protection available to some defendants
prosecuted federally for conduct traditionally within the purview of states
and over which states have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
government. 17 Part IV discusses the receding tide of federalism,
nationalization, and standardization in the criminal law and explains why
rectifying the state/federal procedural disparity gap must be included in that
recalibration process.18 Part V submits that Congress has the obligation to
address this state/federal procedural disparity and proposes that Congress
enact legislation requiring federal courts to apply state rules of criminal
procedure in concurrent jurisdiction prosecutions where a given federal rule
does not provide the same level of protection as its state counterpart. 19 A
failure to do so, this article asserts, perpetuates an unjustifiable state/federal
procedural disparity between defendants who are prosecuted federally for
conduct over which a state has a superior historical and political
jurisdictional claim.20

12

See infra note 102.
See infra text accompanying note 32.
14
See infra note 23.
15
See infra note 23.
16
See infra Part II.
17
See infra Part III.
18
See infra Part IV.
19
See infra Part V.
20
The American political system, of course, consists of three separate and
independent sovereigns—the federal government, the tribal nations, and the states. The
disparate impact of the application of federal criminal law and procedure to defendants
charged in federal court with conduct over which tribal authorities have traditionally exercised
jurisdiction is experienced differently and often more acutely by citizens of Indian nations
tried in federal court. Because of this different dynamic and historical experience, the impact
of the federalization, nationalization, and standardization of criminal law on Native Americans
tried federally for crimes committed in Indian Country is not within the scope of this article.
13
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II. FEDERALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION, AND
NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE21
A. Federalization and Nationalization of Substantive Criminal Law
The contemporary federal government’s prominent role in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal conduct would have been
unrecognizable to the Founders. The early American federal system included
neither a federal police power nor federal jurisdiction over most criminal
conduct, and it wasn’t until after the Civil War that Congress began to
expand the role of the federal government in prosecuting conduct without a
clear and direct nexus to a federal concern. 22 Since then, Congress has
greatly extended the reach of the federal government’s jurisdiction into
territory originally occupied exclusively by the states.23 Rather than supplant
state and local authority to prosecute crimes in these areas, many federal
criminal statutes created concurrent jurisdiction over criminal activity
See Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American Sentencing Disparity Post-Booker, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 723 (2008).
21
These topics have been fully explored elsewhere in many forms. See, e.g.,
Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the Alarm or
“Crying Wolf?,” 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1319–26 (2000) (concise history of federal
criminal law prior to the 1960s). I include a brief overview of this topic to provide the reader
with sufficient background to understand the federalism and historical concerns that inform
the thesis of this argument. This section does not purport to be a comprehensive treatment of
this broad and complex topic.
22
Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1138 (1995) (“Congress’s reluctance to enact
expansive criminal laws may have been partly attributable to a recognition that the Founding
Fathers never envisioned a national police power. Indeed, they were skeptical about general
federal jurisdiction. Thus, what little criminal jurisdiction Congress invoked was often shared
with the states. State courts were given concurrent, and sometimes primary, jurisdiction over
designated federal crimes.”) (citing Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State
Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545, 548–52 (1925)).
23
Brickey, supra note 22, at 1329–30 (“It was not until after the Civil War that
Congress enacted criminal laws that reflected concerns extending beyond direct federal
interests. Newly enacted federal civil rights acts guaranteed all citizens equal rights . . .
[including the right] to benefit from federal enforcement of the newly established rights to
equal protection and equal privileges and immunities under the laws. In addition to imposing
criminal liability for depriving any citizen of a right secured therein, one act conferred federal
jurisdiction over state crimes where the affected citizens were denied their rights or where
state courts would not enforce them. Thus, the federal government assumed concurrent
jurisdiction over murder, assault, and a host of other state crimes.”) (citations and footnotes
omitted). See also Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering
the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721,
726 (2002) (“Driven by an increased emphasis on ‘law and order’ in national politics,
Congress has enacted a steady stream of criminal statutes since the late 1960’s. Indeed,
Congress has created new federal crimes every election year since 1984. According to one
study, since 1970 Congress has enacted more than 40% of the total new federal criminal
provisions passed since the Civil War. Many of these provisions augment preexisting federal
jurisdiction over narcotics and firearms offenses.”).
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historically prosecuted by the states.24 By the 1930s federalization was “in
full swing.”25
Congress has asserted federal criminal jurisdiction over a number of
crimes historically prosecuted by the states. However, the primary areas in
which Congress has created concurrent jurisdiction with the states over
conduct traditionally within the exclusive purview of state criminal justice
systems are domestic possession and distribution of firearms and controlled
substances.26 Despite Congress’s incursion into the criminal justice domain
of the states, the federal government still prosecutes relatively few criminal
cases.27 Thus, in absolute terms, the number of federal defendants prosecuted
for concurrent jurisdiction crimes represents a small fraction of the overall
number of criminal prosecutions in the United States.
24
Maroney, supra note 21, at 1329–30 (“If the number of federal crimes cannot
be ascertained, it is at least possible to describe the nature of federal criminal legislation today.
It constitutes a reversal of the pattern that had held during the first century. That is, ‘the bulk
of the federal criminal code now treats conduct that is also subject to regulation under a state’s
general police powers.’ The relationship between federal and state law is also significant.
While it is true that ‘the amount of individual citizen behavior now potentially subject to
federal criminal control has increased in astonishing proportions,’ it is also true that the new
federal laws generally ‘supplement state law rather than nullifying or displacing it.’ The end
result is ‘a system of dual jurisdiction, where conduct that violates both federal and state law
may be prosecuted by federal authorities, state authorities, or both.’”) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
25
Brickey, supra note 22, at 1143–45 (“By the 1930s the federalization of
American criminal law was in full swing. During this era Congress enacted the Lindbergh Act
(prohibiting the transportation of a kidnapping victim across state lines), the Fugitive Felon
Act (prohibiting inter-state flight to avoid prosecution for enumerated violent felonies), the
National Firearms Act (regulating the sale of guns), the National Stolen Property Act
(prohibiting the transportation of stolen property in interstate commerce), and statutes that
punished robbing a national bank, extortion by telephone, telegraph or radio, and much more.
These developments were critical because they transformed what had been uniquely local
concerns into national ones. . . . [W]ith the advent of the omnibus crime bill, the pace at which
new crimes appeared on the books accelerated. . . . Included among them are the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, the Crime Control Act of
1984, the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1990, and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.”) (footnotes and
statutory citations omitted).
26
See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—
The Center Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1401–03 (2008); O’Hear, supra note 23, at 723
(“[F]ederal law enforcement has dramatically expanded its reach into areas that were once a
nearly exclusive preserve of local and state law enforcement, such as low-level drug and
firearm offenses. Congress propelled this expansion, often referred to as the ‘federalization’ of
criminal law, by passing new criminal statutes and by enhancing law enforcement budgets.”).
27
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 726–29 (“Notwithstanding these recent increases in
federal criminal jurisdiction and resources, states continue to play a dominant role in most
areas of law enforcement. Overall, federal convictions represent fewer than five percent of
total criminal convictions. However, recent trends create a substantially enhanced federal
presence in national law enforcement. Perhaps most controversial is the federal prosecution of
routine ‘street crimes,’ such as low-level gun and drug offenses, which were once a nearly
exclusive preserve of state and local law enforcement.”).
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B. Standardization and Nationalization of Federal Sentencing Law
In 1984 Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) to
achieve national uniformity in sentencing in federal prosecutions.28 Although
the SRA was reportedly inspired by a perception that federal judges were too
lenient in the treatment of federal criminal defendants, the stated goal of the
SRA was to ensure consistency in federal sentencing by constraining federal
judicial discretion. 29 Thus, the uptick in the federalization of criminal law
was followed by the standardization and nationalization of federal sentencing
law. 30 As a result of federalization, the federal government has asserted
jurisdiction over criminal conduct traditionally prosecuted exclusively by the
states.31 As a result of the standardization and increase in federal penalties
for federal crimes, defendants tried federally for this conduct often end up
with exponentially harsher sentences than they would have faced had they
been tried in state court, 32 producing significant sentencing disparities
between state and federal sentences for the same criminal conduct.33 Apart
28
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551–3673 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2000)).
29
Richman, supra note 26, at 1385 (“[T]he SRA . . . reflected the same distrust of
judges and their characteristic leniency that inspired the statutory mandatory minimum
provisions that began to proliferate in the late 1980s. But there is no reason to doubt
Congress’s commitment to uniformity—albeit an extremely thin notion of uniformity, one that
made no attempt to limit executive decisions about which cases to prosecute but simply
sought to ensure that similar defendants so selected would be treated similarly.”). See also
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 723 (“Congressional action in 1984 led to the promulgation of the
Guidelines, which diminished judicial discretion at sentencing and imposed enhanced
sentences on various categories of offenders. Congress also enacted a series of mandatory
minimum sentencing laws throughout the 1980s and 1990s, which had similar effects.”)
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (establishing mandatory minimum
sentences for certain drug offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994) (establishing mandatory
minimum sentences for certain repeat offenders)).
30
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 723 (describing the “collision between two of the
most notable trends that have developed in federal law enforcement during the past thirty
years”—the federalization of substantive criminal law and the increase in the certainty and
severity of federal sentences) (footnotes omitted).
31
Id. at 724 (“[G]rowing numbers of offenders may be prosecuted either under
federal law in federal court or under state law in state court.”).
32
Id. at 731–32 (“Nationwide, federal sentences for drug and gun offenses result
in prison time that is three times greater, on average, than comparable state sentences. Federal
prison time is also longer for a broad range of other offenses, from forgery to aggravated
assault. While these gross national statistics do not adjust for possible differences in the
severity of offenses on state and federal dockets, they do provide support for the widespread
anecdotal evidence of federal-state disparity. Moreover, recent trends towards lower state
sentences suggest that such disparity may be on the rise.”) (footnotes and citations omitted);
See also Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 113–14 (2005).
33
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 731 (“Ironically, federal reforms that were intended
to combat sentencing disparities likely exacerbated disparities between state and federal
sentences. . . [S]tate judges generally have far more discretion than federal judges when
considering mitigating aspects of the defendant’s background and personal characteristics.
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from the vice of producing a facially unjust result, this dynamic has been
criticized for encouraging sentencing “shopping” to maximize the potential
sentence yield in concurrent jurisdiction cases.34
A real, yet hard to quantify, impact of this type of visible disparity is
that it undermines the legitimacy of the federal criminal justice system while
denigrating the role of the states in enforcing and prosecuting criminal
conduct35—an intolerable outcome in a system of government that purports
to defer to the expertise and supremacy of the states in matters of uniquely
local concern with distinctly local impacts.36 However, although nothing in
the SRA prohibits federal courts from considering state/federal sentencing
outcome disparities, federal courts have been decidedly unreceptive to

Similarly, state judges generally have more discretion when considering uncharged criminal
conduct, which, in certain circumstances, must be used to enhance federal sentences. The
scope of disparities evades easy measurement, and likely varies substantially from state to
state and case to case. Anecdotal evidence, however, indicates that disparities may often be
quite dramatic. . . . Perhaps most striking are the federal death penalty cases in states that do
not authorize capital punishment.”) (citing Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893,
916–17 (2000); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the
Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 998–99 (1995);
Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
643, 648–49 (1997)).
34
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 724 (“Police and prosecutors may in some sense
choose a forum, either through case-by-case decisions or through the adoption of general
policies. The choice of forum typically carries with it foreseeable and substantial effects on
sentencing. Indeed, federal and state agents often collaborate in selecting a federal forum with
the specific intention of obtaining the harsher, more certain sentences available under federal
law—a practice that has been decried by critics of federalization.”) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
35
Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
825, 838 (2000) (quoting a state court judge as follows: “[T]he incursion of the national
government subverts the authority of and the regard for the local and state governments,
making it increasingly difficult for those governments to effectively and imaginatively
respond to the needs of their constituents. A political culture that comes to regard the federal
government as its guardian relegates the local and state governments to secondary status. The
premise—articulated or not—is that these lesser governments are not capable of handling
important matters. Public confidence and commitment are diminished. Ultimately,
federalization obscures the boundaries of political responsibility and accountability,
undermines the confidence constituents have in their officials, and erodes the authority of the
local and state institutions.”); see also Task Force on Federalization of Criminal Law, Am.
Bar Ass’n, Report on the Federalization of Criminal Law (1998) at 42–43 (“Confusion of state
and federal authority can leave citizens uncertain about who bears the responsibility for
dealing with crime,” noting that “[p]ublic accountability in the state and local segments of
government is higher.”).
36
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 755 (“With some notable exceptions, such as
nationwide drug distribution schemes and crimes against federal agents and property, the
effects of crime seem largely localized to a particular community.”); Sun Beale, supra note
33, at 1000–04 (explaining the disparate treatment of defendants); Clymer, supra note 33, at
739 (same).
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arguments that federal defendants should receive downward sentencing
departures to correct these types of disparities.37
C. Standardization and Nationalization of Criminal Procedure
The term “criminal procedure” encompasses two different, but
overlapping, bodies of law—constitutional criminal procedure and rulebased criminal procedure. While interrelated, they have distinct historical
pedigrees and legal trajectories that require separate consideration. 38 The
focus of this article is rule-based criminal procedure. But a brief
consideration of the evolution of a federalized constitutional criminal
procedure is necessary to fully appreciate the extent to which the Mississippi
Problem has been set on its head, as this article contends.
1. Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Before the American Revolution, the federal constitution operated as
a “background limitation on the power of the states” in all areas of law,
including state criminal law.39 Until 1925, the Bill of Rights (i.e. the first ten
37

O’Hear, supra note 23, at 724–25 (“The federal appellate courts have
categorically rejected the relevance of state sentencing practices for purposes of federal
sentencing. Despite the ease with which courts have reached this conclusion, it is not
expressly required by any statute or by the Guidelines themselves. Rather, courts rely on an
implicit mandate they find in the structure of the Guidelines—a mandate for ‘nationwide
uniformity,’ by which the courts apparently mean interdistrict uniformity among federal
courts.”) (citing United States v. Willis, 139 F.3d 811, 812 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a
defendant’s argument for a downward departure on the basis of state/federal sentencing
disparity); United States v. Snyder, 136 F.3d 65, 69–70 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); United States
v. Schulte, 144 F.3d 1107, 1110–11 (7th Cir. 1998) (same)). For an interesting, but ultimately
unsuccessful effort to extend some deference to a state court’s attempt to lessen the impact of
a federal court sentence under principles of federal comity by terminating a state court
sentence to enable defendant to become eligible for a federal safety valve sentence see United
States v. Yepez, 652 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 704 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012)
(requiring district court to consider terminated state probationary sentence in imposing a
federal sentence even if it did make defendant ineligible for the federal safety valve and
resulted in a disparate sentence; “granting a state court the power to determine whether a
federal defendant is eligible for safety valve relief under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is
closer to abdication than comity.”).
38
For example, some Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure overlap with, and are
informed by, companion constitutional doctrines. Impartial jury and change of venue
procedures, for example, are addressed in federal prosecutions by Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 21, and governed by the Sixth Amendment in both state and federal prosecutions.
39
Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993
SUP. CT. REV. 65, 66–67 (1993) (Noting that the federal constitution was relevant, “primarily,
though not exclusively, on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and that
“[a]lthough it was federal law, and thus ‘supreme,’ the Due Process Clause left substantial
room for the development and day-to-day operation of state criminal procedure doctrine. In
other words, before the Revolution, federal constitutional law affected the handling of state
criminal cases in much the same way that it affected other common kinds of state action, such
as the regulation of property rights or the administration of public schools and universities.”).

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss1/1

8

Gross: The Upside Down Mississippi Problem: Addressing Procedural Dispar

2015]

THE UPSIDE DOWN MISSISSIPPI PROBLEM

9

amendments to the U.S. Constitution) was understood to constrain only the
federal Congress’s ability to pass laws abridging certain freedoms and
granting “persons” or “the people” the right to be free from specific conduct
or actions by the federal government.40 In 1925, the Supreme Court began a
process of selective incorporation of certain Bill of Rights guarantees into the
Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate that no “State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”41
The earliest incorporation cases addressed primarily the guarantees
under the First Amendment. 42 It was not until the 1960s and 1970s, during
the Warren Court era, that the Court turned its attention to the criminal
procedure guarantees in the Bill of Rights and began deciding whether those
specific guarantees would be incorporated into the process due defendants in
state criminal investigations and prosecutions under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 43 Before the Court incorporated specific criminal procedural
40
Before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and the development
of the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme Court specifically held that the Bill of Rights
applied only to the federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). The
Supreme Court also initially rejected incorporation after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
41
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. An alternative argument, as yet adopted by a
majority of the Court, asserts that the proper vehicle for incorporation is the privilege or
immunities clause, not the due process clause, of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (privileges or immunity clause
“eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall
apply to the States.”). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (“No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States[.]”). A privileges or immunities approach would counsel the wholesale incorporation of
the entire Bill of Rights (save those amendments that clearly only apply to the federal
government), rather than the incremental, piecemeal incorporation by way of the due process
clause. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring
in majority holding that Second Amendment applies to states, but taking issue with majority’s
reliance on due process clause, rather than privileges or immunities clause, as vehicle for
incorporation).
42
See Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech) (dicta);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of press); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937) (freedom of assembly); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise of
religion); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment of religion);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of expressive association); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (petition for redress of grievances).
43
The rights and guarantees applicable to criminal investigations and
prosecutions are found in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and include the rights to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures
(U.S. CONST. amend. IV), the right to indictment by a grand jury for infamous crimes, to be
free from double jeopardy, not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, or be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law (U.S. CONST. amend. V), the right to a
speedy and public trial, an impartial jury, to be informed of charges, to confront witnesses, to
have compulsory process, to have the assistance of counsel (U.S. CONST. amend. VI), and
prohibitions against excessive bail and infliction of cruel and unusual punishment (U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII). Of these rights and guarantees, only the right to presentment or
indictment by a Grand Jury and the right to have a jury selected from residents of the state and
district where the crime occurred, and the prohibition against excessive fines have not been
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protections required by the Bill of Rights, those guarantees were understood
to apply only to federal court proceedings. 44 The outcome of the Warren
Court’s incorporation project was the systematic incorporation of most of the
specific criminal procedure guarantees contained in the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.45
The Warren Court’s reconceptualization of state autonomy vis-à-vis
the federal government over state and local criminal investigations and
prosecutions is often understood as the federal judicial reaction to the
“Mississippi Problem”—the failure of state courts, particularly in the South,
to fully protect the rights of economically and racially marginalized
defendants, most often poor African Americans. The working premise of
incorporation, thus, was “that the state bench was, at its worst racist and
incompetent, and merely competent most of the time.”46 This is the Supreme

incorporated and applied to the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (grand jury
right); Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1988) (right to have jury selected from
residents of state and district where crime occurred); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742
(2010) (excessive fines).
44
Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State
Constitutional Law and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 70
(1996) (“Under the incorporation doctrine, certain rights in the Bill of Rights, originally
restrictions on only the federal government, become, when ‘incorporated’ into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, restrictions upon the state governments as well.”) (footnotes
omitted) (citing Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (Fifth Amendment Taking
Clause, and by implication the entire Bill of Rights, restricted only the federal government)
and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n. 14 (1968).
45
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (unreasonable search and seizure);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964) (warrant requirement); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (warrantless search or
seizure standard), Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967) (speedy trial), In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by impartial jury for non-petty offenses); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) (informed of accusations); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confront witnesses);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
85 (1932) (assistance of counsel in capital cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(assistance of counsel in felony cases); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (assistance
of counsel for imprisonable misdemeanors); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(cruel and unusual punishment); Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1529 (2008) (dicta) (excessive
bail).
46
Latzer, supra note 44 (“Incorporation was also predicated upon an
assumption—a very negative assumption—about the states, and especially about state courts.
The assumption was that some state courts were chronically, and virtually all state courts were
occasionally, backward. Without the Supreme Court to stand over them, ready to review and
reverse, the state courts would fail to provide the minimal rights that all defendants were
entitled to at all times. In short, incorporation was motivated by the Mississippi Problem: the
assumption that the state bench was, at its worst racist and incompetent, and merely competent
most of the time.”); Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old is New Again, Fundamental Fairness
and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 106–07 (2005) (noting
that the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases are considered a branch of “race law”
because they arose in the context of federal judicial reaction to institutionalized racism in state
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Court’s companion piece to Congress’s federalization of criminal jurisdiction
and nationalization of federal sentencing law.
Following incorporation, the process due persons in most aspects of
a state criminal investigation or proceeding is determined exclusively by
reference to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of the Bill of
Rights. Thus, where the Supreme Court has incorporated a particular
provision of the federal Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, a
state criminal procedure or process may not fall below what the Supreme
Court has identified as the floor of protection required by the federal
Constitution. Stated another way, individual state criminal processes and
procedures may offer more protection to a criminal suspect or defendant.47
But they may not offer less than what the Supreme Court has decided is the
federal constitutional minimum.48
The functional result of incorporation is that the Supreme Court has
occupied virtually the entire field of constitutional criminal procedure and
subjected state criminal justice systems to federal judicial regulation and
management. Incorporation has produced “a detailed, national Code of
Criminal Procedure” that must be followed at every level of government in
the United States and that almost completely “supersedes state law.”49 True
to its intent, incorporation has ensured a national baseline of criminal
procedural guarantees to which all persons subject to criminal investigation
and prosecution are entitled in state and federal prosecutions.
The values and virtues of consistency and uniformity in criminal
procedure that were the goal of incorporation have been (at least
theoretically) well-served. On the other hand, the federalization,
criminal justice systems following Reconstruction and in the context of the struggle for civil
rights).
47
Donald A. Dripps, Does Liberal Procedure Cause Punitive Substance?
Preliminary Evidence from Some Natural Experiments, 87 S.CAL. L. REV. 459, 463, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326757 (“The Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution had
three primary components; the exclusionary rule, the right to counsel, and Miranda. The
impact of the revolution, however, was not uniform across jurisdictions. About half the states
had adopted the exclusionary rule before Mapp, and a majority of states provided indigent
felony defendants court-appointed counsel before Gideon. No jurisdiction anticipated
Miranda exactly, but some jurisdictions were regulating police interrogation more rigorously
than others.”).
48
Latzer, supra note 44, at 75 (“By its very nature, incorporation established
United States Supreme Court hegemony over the state bench. As the ultimate interpreter of the
federal Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court became the final authority regarding the scope and
nature of its guarantees; the state courts were to be compelled to conform to national mandates
established by the Supreme Court, absent more protective state procedures. In the 1960s, and
for the next two decades, as criminal procedure rose to the top of the Supreme Court’s agenda,
the Court rendered dozens of decisions glossing the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth
Amendments. Each such decision established an imperative for state proceedings, which the
state courts could enlarge, but never deny. Incorporation thus shifted the initiative for
developing criminal procedure law from the state courts and state legislatures to the United
States Supreme Court.”).
49
Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 39, at 67.
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nationalization and standardization of criminal procedural law through
incorporation has also been criticized for stifling development of
jurisdictionally appropriate approaches to criminal justice reform and
innovation on the state and local level by requiring states to conform to a
one-size-fits-all approach to criminal procedure. 50
2. Rule-Based Criminal Procedure
In contemporary practice, all federal courts follow the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, along with individual District or Circuit rules. The
concept of a standard, national set of federal rules is probably unremarkable
to most federal practitioners and jurists. However, the federal criminal and
civil rules of procedure are of relatively recent vintage. Indeed, as set out
below, there was no national or uniform set of federal criminal procedural
rules for the first 150 years of the federal judiciary’s existence.
Congress’s first federal law dictating procedural requirements for the
federal courts is the Judiciary Act of 1789. 51 The Judiciary Act of 1789
contained a number of procedural provisions to govern the courts of the
United States, including procedures relating to granting new trials,
administering oaths, and punishing contempt. 52 The Judiciary Act of 1789
further authorized the federal judiciary “to make and establish all necessary
rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts[.]”53
Less than a week after passing the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
approved the Process Act of 1789. The Process Act of 1789 took away the
discretion Congress had just granted to the federal judiciary to make rules. 54
50

Latzer, supra note 44, at 64–65 (“There can be little question that incorporation
forced the states to adopt uniform procedures without regard to local needs. In the decades
since the 1960s, when the Supreme Court ‘selectively’ incorporated nearly all of the criminal
procedure rights in the Bill of Rights, the state courts have had little choice but to give force to
these federal procedures (absent broader state rights). No matter how costly, no matter how
inefficient, no matter how difficult to implement, no matter how much injustice they might
cause, and no matter how inappropriate to local circumstances they might be, the state courts
have had to give effect to these federal procedural rights. These disadvantages of
incorporation were acknowledged even in the 1960s, but they were believed to be outweighed
by one important value: equality. Whatever the disadvantages in stifling state uniqueness,
independence, and freedom to experiment, the advantage of uniform treatment of defendants
throughout the United States, at least with respect to the fundamental rights of the Bill of
Rights, seemed to justify incorporation.”) (footnotes omitted).
51
Ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257).
52
See Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What
the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37
PEPP. L. REV. 847, 884–86 (2010).
53
Ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83. Section 17 of the Judiciary Act provided in part:
“And be it further enacted, That all the said courts of the United States shall have power . . . to
make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts,
provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States.” Id.
54
Ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (1789). The Process Act of 1789 is also sometimes
referred to as the “First Conformity Act.” See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
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Instead, Congress instructed federal trial courts in actions at common law to
adopt the “modes of process” in effect in the state courts of the state in which
the federal court was situated. 55 Congress subsequently incorporated some
specific criminal procedural requirements into the first federal criminal
statutes enacted shortly after it passed the Judiciary and Process Acts. In
1790, for example, Congress enacted a federal treason statute that contained
specific notice requirements and a self-incrimination provision.56
Almost one hundred years later, in the civil context, Congress
enacted the Conformity Act of 1872, which required federal courts to
conform the practice and procedure to the procedures used by the state in
which the federal court sat in like cases (other than in equity and admiralty
matters). 57 In 1934 Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act. 58 This Act
authorized the federal judiciary to promulgate federal rules of civil
procedure.59 Pursuant to this authority, the Court promulgated the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Enacted in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1002 (3d ed. 1998) (“[T]he first Conformity Act (also called the
Process Act of 1789) . . . provided that the procedure in actions at law in the federal courts
should be the same in each state “as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the
same.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).
55
The Process Act provided, in pertinent part: “until further provision shall be
made, and except where by this act or other statutes of the United States is otherwise
provided, the forms of writs and executions, except their style, and modes of process and rates
of fees, except fees to judges, in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law, shall be
the same in each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the
same.” See Paul Taylor, supra note 52, at 885–86 (“Federal courts interpreted the Process Act
to require them to follow state court rules not only in the form of the processes they issued but
also in the procedures they employed. . . . and [t]hose who favored the adoption of state
procedure ultimately prevailed over those who favored a standardized code of uniform federal
procedure.”).
56
See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 118 (1790) (requiring those
accused of treason to receive copy of the indictment and a list of witnesses and jurors three
days before trial, and providing for a two day notice requirement for all other capital cases);
§ 30, 1 Stat. 119 (the silence of the accused is not to be treated as a guilty plea); § 32, 1 Stat.
119 (establishing statute of limitations for prosecution).
57
See Wright et al., supra note 54, at § 1002 (“The conformity required by the
[First Conformity] Act of 1789 was a static conformity that forced the federal courts in the
original states to apply local state practice as it existed in 1789[.] . . . [I]n 1828 [Congress
enacted] a new Conformity Act applicable to states admitted after 1789, which provided that
the procedure in common law suits in federal courts in such states should be the same as that
‘then’ used in the highest court of original and general jurisdiction of the state in question.
Fourteen years later, a similar enactment was necessary to provide a procedure for cases
arising in states admitted into the union between 1828 and 1842. With regard to states
admitted between 1842 and 1872, the conformity principle was incorporated directly into the
enactments granting statehood or was extended to those states by judicial construction.”)
(footnotes and citations omitted).
58
Pub. L. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064, enacted June 19, 1934, codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072.
59
Id. Under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress retains the power to reject the
Court’s proposed rules or amendments, to modify them, or to enact rules or amendments
itself. See id.
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Procedure were generally perceived as an improvement in existing procedure
in federal civil cases.60
The success of the civil rules led to support for a similar undertaking
in the criminal arena. In 1940 Congress granted the Supreme Court authority
to establish uniform criminal rules under the Sumners Courts Act. 61
Subsequent amendments to the Rules Enabling Act authorized the federal
judiciary to promulgate the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and other
procedural rules. 62 The Supreme Court adopted the first Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure in 1944, covering procedures up to verdict. In 1946, the
Court adopted a second set of criminal rules, covering post-verdict
procedures.63 The full set of Criminal Rules took effect on March 21, 1946.64
This history demonstrates a number of things. First, the process of
developing a national set of criminal procedural rules has been an iterative, if
slightly disorganized, one. Second, although contemporary practitioners and
judges have known nothing but a set of national rules (with some local
variations) as a given in the federal court system, national uniformity in this
context is a relatively recent development, having come into existence as
recently as the mid-1940s. And third, the concept of applying state
procedural rules in federal cases is neither novel nor unprecedented.
III. THE STATE/FEDERAL PROCEDURAL DISPARITY GAP
Observers have forwarded a number of criticisms of Congress’s
federalization of the U.S. criminal justice system. 65 Two of those criticisms
60
Preface, DRAFTING H ISTORY OF THE F EDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
P ROCEDURE (Madeleine J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin, eds., 1991), p. xi (“The ensuing
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . were generally well received and there were many who
believed that the various criminal rules in use in the District Courts should be made uniform
as well. Consequently, Congress granted the Supreme Court the power to make rules of
procedure for criminal cases[.]”) (footnotes omitted).
61
The Sumners Courts Act of June 29, 1940, Pub. L. 76-675, 54 Stat. 688 (1940)
later codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Pursuant to this authority, the Supreme Court appointed an
Advisory Committee for the criminal rules, which published its Preliminary Drafts for
comment in 1943 and 1944. Wilken & Triffin, supra. note 42, at xiii-xiv.
62
The Rules Enabling Act, then codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771, authorized the
promulgation of certain criminal rules. Congress repealed 18 U.S.C. § 3771 in 1988 and
merged the criminal and civil rules enabling acts. See Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, § 404(a)(1), 102 Stat. 4642, 4651 (1988), and
incorporated authorization for the Rules under the Rules Enabling Act, now codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074. In 1988, Congress unified the criminal and civil rule-making authority
under one statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077.
63
18 U.S.C. § 3771 (process prior to a verdict or guilty plea) and 3772 (postverdict process) (repealed Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, § 404(a)(1), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat.
4642, 4651).
64
Wilken & Triffin, supra note 60, at p. xv.
65
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 726–29 (“Academics and policy-makers often
criticize federalization. They have advanced at least four major arguments. First, critics
contend that federalization threatens the ‘delicate balance’ between the state and the federal
government envisioned by the Constitution, potentially undermining the stature of state
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are of particular relevance to this article. One, federalization threatens the
“delicate” federal/state constitutional balance, “potentially undermining the
stature of state criminal justice systems.”66 And two, federalism may produce
“disparate results for the same criminal conduct, depending on whether the
conduct is prosecuted by federal or state authorities.”67 Another concern is
that federal over-involvement in criminal matters traditionally within the

criminal justice systems. Second, critics observe that federalization enhances the power of
unelected federal prosecutors. Third, critics argue that federalization threatens to overwhelm
federal courts with criminal cases, which may interfere with civil dockets. Finally, critics note
that federalization may lead to disparate results for the same criminal conduct, depending on
whether the conduct is prosecuted by federal or state authorities.”) (citing TASK FORCE, supra
note 1, at 7). See also Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of
Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789 (1996); John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the
Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 687 (1999); Sun Beale, supra note 33,
at 1000–04; Clymer, supra note 33, at 739; Dennis E. Curtis, The Effect of Federalization on
the Defense Function, 543 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 103 (1996); Ehrlich, supra note
35, at 825–26 (2000); Philip B. Heymann & Mark H. Moore, The Federal Role in Dealing
With Violent Street Crime: Principles, Questions, and Cautions, 543 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 185 (1996); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127 (1997); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893,
957 (2000); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal
Criminal Legislation, 543 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15 (1996); William H.
Rehnquist, Remarks on the Federalization of Criminal Law, 11 FED. SENTENCING R. 132
(1998); Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543
ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39 (1996).
66
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 728; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 28
(1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“As the Court pointed out in Abbate v. United States, ‘the
States under our federal system have the principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting
crimes.’ The Court endangers this allocation of responsibility for the prevention of crime
when it applies to the States doctrines developed in the context of federal law enforcement,
without any attention to the special problems which the States as a group or particular States
may face.”); Brickey, supra note 4, at 1166–67 (“If the federal justice system is to function
effectively and continue to dispense justice, the legislative and executive branches of
government must exercise restraint. In particular, Congress must show more regard for the
states. In enacting death penalty provisions for dozens of crimes, for example, Congress chose
to override the decisions of fourteen states and the District of Columbia to ban capital
punishment.”). Id. at n. 172 (noting that this point is “especially true in the case of federal
death penalty crimes that may be committed wholly intrastate and thus do not implicate a
substantial federal interest.”) (citing Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1971 (1994)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 36(b)(2)(A)) (drive-by shootings); Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1969 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3)) (carjacking); Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1969 (1994) (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1)) (violent crimes in aid of
racketeering); Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1970 (1994) (18 U.S.C. § 241) (conspiracy
against rights); Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1970 (1994) (18 U.S.C. § 242) (deprivation of
rights under color of law); Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1970 (1994) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)) (federally protected activities); 18 U.S.C. § 924; Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1973 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(i)) (gun murders during
federal crimes of violence and drug trafficking crimes)).
67
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 729.
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purview of the states stifles innovation. 68 A related concern is that the
availability of different and higher punishment or less stringent procedures in
the federal system may encourage “forum shopping” by federal prosecutors
in matters involving concurrent jurisdiction in order to maximize both the
likelihood of conviction and the potential sentence for the conduct
involved.69
As discussed above, federal sentences under the SRA have proven to
be extremely harsh as compared to state sentences for similar conduct. A
significant amount of attention has been rightly devoted to the disparate
results of charging and sentencing laws under state and federal law for the
same conduct. Less written about, but as significant, federal criminal
defendants may also be afforded less procedural protection than state court
defendants in the same geographic jurisdiction. 70 Examples include the
discovery rules, which are quite constrained under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,71 and change of venue standards, which may be more
liberal under state procedural rules.72

68

Brickey, supra note 22, at 1172–73 (“The federal government’s assumption of
a major responsibility for maintaining local law and order is not only harmful to the federal
justice system. It is also harmful to the states. When the government preempts local
prosecutions in areas of overlapping jurisdiction, it interferes with a state’s ability to exercise
discretion in a way that is responsive to local concerns. Excessive use of federal jurisdiction
diminishes the prestige of local law enforcement authorities and thus may interfere with their
development of responsibility for and capacity to handle complex matters or detract from the
distinctive role states play as ‘laboratories of change.’”).
69
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 732 (“Enhanced federal-state disparities, coupled
with federalization, provide increased impetus for forum shopping. By choosing a federal
forum, law enforcement authorities typically obtain a longer sentence than they would obtain
in state court. State and federal agents have taken advantage of the growing potential for
sentence shopping in a variety of ways.”) (footnote and citation omitted).
70
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 761–62 (“In addition to its tendency to undercut state
sentencing policy preferences, national uniformity may affect state criminal procedure policies
similarly. State criminal procedures typically differ from federal procedures in several
important respects, including pretrial detention, pretrial discovery, suppression of evidence,
and parole. Collectively, a state’s policy decisions in these areas represent a particular way of
balancing the competing interests of criminal defendants, law enforcement agents, and society
at large.”).
71
See John D. Cline, It Is Time to Fix the Federal Criminal System, 35-SEP
CHAMPION 34 (Sept. 2011) (“In some states, liberal discovery rules offset the prosecutor’s
overwhelming pre-indictment information-gathering advantage. In the federal system,
however, discovery is limited.”); H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed
Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1991) (“It is an astonishing anomaly that in federal courts
virtually unrestricted discovery is granted in civil cases, whereas discovery is severely limited
in criminal matters.”).
72
See Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 COLUM.
L. REV. 349, 360–61 (1960) (noting that some states have embodied change of venue rights in
their constitutions, others (like the federal system) permit removal in specified situations
delineated by statute or rule of court, while other states’ procedures provide for a change of
venue as a matter of right if certain conditions are met) (footnotes omitted).
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IV. THE RECEDING TIDE
The phenomenon of federalization, standardization, and
nationalization of criminal law in the United States is not of design. It is an
outgrowth of a multitude of era-specific concerns and political forces. In the
early phases of federalization of the substantive law, concerns about states’
ability to regulate and reach certain conduct in the economic arena, along
with Congress’s embrace of expansive federal Commerce Clause authority,
set the stage for further and further incursions into the substantive criminal
law. 73 This has culminated, as noted, in overlapping federal and state
jurisdiction over a category of criminal conduct historically and traditionally
subject only to state prosecution. In the criminal procedure arena, as noted,
the federalization of the law was informed by the “Mississippi problem”—a
federal concern that some states were either unable or unwilling to protect
the federal constitutional rights of all defendants prosecuted in their courts.
Federal sentencing reform, which imposed national uniformity and
standardization upon federal judges, and the introduction of many mandatory
minimum sentences took place against the backdrop of the war on drugs,
animated by the twin objectives of increasing the potential penalties
generally for federal offenses and eliminating sentencing disparities among
federal trial courts by constraining federal judicial discretion in sentencing. 74
The phenomenon of federalization, nationalization, and
standardization of criminal law and procedure has been a steady and complex
process. But, it is a relatively recent development, and it is not a
constitutionally-obvious outcome in the American federal system. Rather, it
is but a chapter in the history of the development of American criminal law
and procedure—not a prologue, not the entire story, and not the final chapter.
Whether viewed as an overcorrection, a historical necessity, or a bold
experiment, there appears to be an emerging sensibility that it is time to at
least reflect on the wisdom of the federal incursion into aspects of American
criminal justice traditionally dominated by the states. 75 Academics,
commentators, judges and practitioners have, for some time, been issuing
calls for reevaluating the current state/federal balance of authority and for
73

See Brickey, supra note 22, at 1172–73 (“The original role of federal criminal
law was auxiliary to that of the states. Federal law addressed matters of substantial federal
concern that were beyond the reach of the states. The evolution of a national police power
paralleled the rise of economic regulation. Increased economic regulation inspired a Congress
enamored with commerce-based jurisdiction to add more and more crimes to the books. Thus,
as economic regulation ascended, criminal law flourished as well. But somewhere along the
line, federal criminal law lost its compass. Congress, disregarding the auxiliary nature of
federal law enforcement, placed federal criminal law on an evolutionary collision course with
state criminal law. Thus, instead of complementing state criminal law, federal law began
competing with it. Federal duplication of state criminal law unduly burdens the federal justice
system, which is ill-equipped to supplant local law enforcement.”) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
74
Id. at 1173.
75
See supra note 65.
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resuscitating some first principles of federalism in the criminal justice
system.76 And, although none of the federal branches has yet to engage in a
complete about-face, recent times have seen a few indicators that a
federalism renaissance may play an important, if not a dominant role, in the
next phase of this ongoing story.
Further, some have argued that the impetus for the nationalization
and federalization of constitutional criminal procedure, the Mississippi
Problem, has evaporated, warranting reconsideration of the wisdom of
incorporation, and possibly even “deincorporation” of some of the
constitutional criminal mandates placed on the states by the Warren Court
era decisions. 77 A secondary and related concern is that the jurisdictional
redundancy currently imbedded in the system is neither sustainable nor
justifiable. 78 The Court has not taken steps to roll back its incorporation
revolution of the 1960s. But it has revived concepts of federalism and
deference to state court procedure. In doing do, the Court has demonstrated
at least a willingness to reexamine the proper balance between the states and
the federal government in the criminal justice arena.79
In the last two decades, the Supreme Court has, for the first time,
reined in Congress’s nationalization and standardization of the criminal law.
The most notable example has been in its reexamination of Congress’s power
to federalize criminal activity under the Commerce Clause, which has been
the vehicle for federal incursion in to areas of substantive criminal law

76
See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text; infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
77
Latzer, supra note 44, at 66 (asserting the “Mississippi Problem” is past and
that because “state courts are no longer rights-antediluvians, . . . an entire set of assumptions
underlying incorporation has eroded.”).
78
Brickey, supra note 22, at 1168–69 (“Congress should heed Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s warning that ‘we can no longer afford the luxury of state and federal courts that
work at cross-purposes or irrationally duplicate one another.’ The state and federal justice
systems are interdependent, and there is a real need to achieve a balance between their
respective jurisdictions. Federal courts should be viewed as ‘distinctive forums of limited
jurisdiction, meant to complement state courts rather than supplant them.’ That is true not only
because of federalism principles, but also because of the strain that expansive use of federal
criminal jurisdiction puts on the system.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).
79
TIMOTHY A. BAUGHMAN, GILLESPIE MICH. CRIM. L. & PROC. SEARCH & SEIZ.
§ 1:2 (2d ed. 2014) (“The Warren Court years were appropriately known as the era of the
‘criminal law revolution,’ or, more accurately, the ‘criminal procedure revolution.’ . . . The
end result of the revolution was the federalization of virtually every aspect of state criminal
procedure. Interestingly, it now appears that the revolution has come full circle. Though the
present Court has shown little inclination to pull back from the established federalization of
state criminal procedure, it has revived long dormant principles of federalism in dealing with
federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.”) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797
(1991); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989),
abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976)).
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previously occupied only by the states. 80 Congress’s extensive reliance on
the Commerce Clause to regulate and criminalize activities with distinctly
local impacts went virtually unchecked by the Court until 1995 when it
decided United States v. Lopez.81 Lopez struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, a federal statute making it a crime to carry a gun within
1000 feet of a school.82 This was the first time in fifty years that the Court
found Congress had exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause.
United States v. Morrison, decided in 2000, removed any doubt that
the Court’s reexamination of Congress’s Commerce Clause power in Lopez
was an anomaly.83 Morrison considered the constitutionality of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which Congress passed under its
power to regulate interstate commerce.84 A critical defect in the legislation
the Court considered in Lopez was Congress’s failure to provide sufficient
evidence of a nexus between the conduct it was attempting to reach and the
Commerce Clause.85 In Morrison, unlike Lopez, Congress provided a lengthy
documentation of the evidence of the relationship between interstate
commerce and gender-motivated violence it was relying on to enact the
VAWA.86
The question in Morrison was whether Congress exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the VAWA. The Court
held that it had, finding that gender-motivated crimes are not economic
crimes, dismissing Congress’s documented evidence that these crimes can
have a substantial effect on commerce.87 The Court observed that if Congress
80

Brickey, supra note 22, at 1142–43 (“The first part of the twentieth century
brought with it the Mann Act (prohibiting transporting a woman across state lines for illicit
purposes), the Dyer Act (prohibiting transporting a stolen motor vehicle across state lines), the
Volstead Act (just plain Prohibition), and statutes forbidding interstate transportation of
lottery tickets, inter-state transportation of obscene literature, and selling liquor through the
mail. As these examples illustrate, Congress had begun to rely on the commerce power (with
ever increasing regularity) to enlarge federal criminal jurisdiction. The advent of railroads,
automobiles, and airplanes made state boundaries ‘increasingly porous.’ If the
constitutionality of commerce-based criminal jurisdiction was ever in serious doubt, the issue
was fairly short-lived.”) (citing L AWRENCE M. F RIEDMAN , C RIME AND P UNISHMENT IN
A MERICAN H ISTORY 71 (1994) (statutory citations omitted). Brickey, supra note 4, at 1168
(arguing that to be faithful to federalism “Congress should . . . refrain from tacking on
marginally relevant jurisdictional elements to bring matters of primarily local interest into the
federal sphere,” as it has by using “interstate commerce as a jurisdictional hook to federalize
domestic abuse [and] or invoking its power to regulate controlled substances in order to
federalize drive-by shootings and participation in local street gangs.”) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
81
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
82
Id. at 551.
83
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). For a discussion of Morrison
see Madhavi M. McCall & Michael A. McCall, Chief Justice William Rehnquist: His Lawand-Order Legacy and Impact on Criminal Justice, 39 AKRON L. REV. 323, 363–65 (2006).
84
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
85
Id. at 612–14.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 619–20.
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were permitted to rely on the Commerce Clause to regulate gender-motivated
violence, it would be able to use the Commerce Clause as a vehicle to
“completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and
local authority.”88 In other words, if Congress could regulate gender-related
violence in the VAWA, it could regulate any crime and violent activity even
though the regulation of violence and crime is a state issue.89
The Court recently exhibited an increased solicitousness towards
state authority over conduct with exclusively or primarily local impacts in
Bond v. United States.90 Bond attempted to seek revenge on a woman with
whom her husband had an affair by placing caustic substances on objects the
woman was likely to touch, including her mailbox, car, and doorknob, which
caused the woman to develop an irritating rash.91 Bond was indicted for two
counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 229, which makes it a federal offense to
knowingly possess or use any chemical that “can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals” where not intended
for a “peaceful purpose.”92
Congress enacted the statute at issue in Bond to enforce the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998. 93 The
Implementation Act, in turn, implemented provisions of the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, a treaty ratified by the United
States in 1997.94 The issue decided by the Court in Bond was whether the
statute reached beyond the scope of the treaty and invaded an area
traditionally within the exclusive domain of state and local police powers, to
wit, assault by poisoning. 95 The Court, relying heavily on federalism
principles, held that the statute at issue was not intended to reach this
conduct.96
88

Id. at 615.
Brickey, supra note 22, at 1167–68 (positing that “Congress should also resist
the temptation to view federal crimes as interstitial gap fillers [as with the VAWA, which]
punishe[d] crossing a state line with intent to injure or harass a spouse or intimate partner if
the actor intentionally commits a crime of violence that injures the spouse or partner. . . .
Regardless of one’s views on how expansively state law should define the crime of rape, it is
highly questionable whether this reasoning is consistent with principles of federalism. It is an
overt attempt to substitute the judgment of Congress for those of state legislatures and courts
on a matter peculiarly within the domain of the states.”).
90
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
91
Id. at 2083.
92
Id. at 2084; see also §§ 229(a), 229F(1), (7), (8).
93
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681–856 (2000), 22 U.S.C. § 6701 et seq.; 18
U.S.C. § 229 et seq.
94
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2083.
95
Id. (“The question presented by this case is whether the Implementation Act
also reaches a purely local crime: an amateur attempt by a jilted wife to injure her husband’s
lover, which ended up causing only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing with
water.”).
96
Id. (“Because our constitutional structure leaves local criminal activity
primarily to the States, we have generally declined to read federal law as intruding on that
89
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In the federal sentencing arena, the Court dealt Congress’s
standardization of federal sentencing a constitutional blow in 2005, when it
invalidated the mandatory aspects of the federal sentencing regime in United
States v. Booker under the Sixth Amendment. 97 In its place, the Court
instructed federal trial courts to adhere to a statutory “reasonableness”
standard and acknowledged that its constitutional ruling would undermine
Congress’s efforts at national uniformity in federal sentencing: “[w]e cannot
and do not claim that use of a ‘reasonableness’ standard will provide the
uniformity that Congress originally sought to secure [through mandatory
Guidelines].”98
The Supreme Court is not alone in recognizing that the federal
substantive criminal law and sentencing system that has dominated our
recent history has produced disparity, unfairness, and disequilibrium. On the
executive level, citing the disparate impact of federal mandatory minimum
laws on low income and minority communities, especially when invoked in
prosecuting low-level drug crimes, Attorney General Eric Holder announced
in September 2013 that the U.S. Department of Justice, as a policy matter,
would reduce the use of federal charges carrying mandatory minimum
sentences.99 Further, a new political dialogue may be emerging on the issues
of federal sentencing reform to address the current state/federal sentencing
disparity.100
V. CLOSING THE PROCEDURAL DISPARITY GAP AS THE TIDE
RECEDES
This article posits that the federalization, standardization, and
nationalization of American criminal law may be reaching its apex and that a
systemic federalism self-correction may be underway (or at least current
political conditions make it possible for the first time). As described above,
areas in which both subtle and overt self-correction have manifested
themselves include the Supreme Court’s rejection, for the first time, that
Congress’s authority to regulate the criminal law under the Commerce
Clause, and to impose national uniformity in sentencing by severely
constraining federal judicial discretion is without limit. It also includes the
recognition of the unfairness wrought by federal mandatory minimum
sentences on low-income communities, particularly when invoked in lowresponsibility, unless Congress has clearly indicated that the law should have such reach. The
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act contains no such clear indication, and we
accordingly conclude that it does not cover the unremarkable local offense at issue here.”).
97
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
98
Id. at 263.
99
NPR Morning Edition: Holder Makes Moral Argument Against Mandatory
Sentences, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 20, 2013) (transcript available at:
http://www.npr.org/2013/09/20/224347967/holder-makes-moral-argument-againstmandatory-sentences) (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
100
Id.
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level drug crimes, the investigation and prosecution of which historically fell
within states’ exclusive jurisdiction.
This article submits that it is not enough for the federal courts to
redraw the state/federal jurisdictional lines in the substantive criminal law or
correct the excesses of Congress’s sentencing uniformity project to right the
balance of state and federal law enforcement power. 101 Significant
state/federal prosecution disparities will remain if procedural law is not
brought into the recalibration process as well.
Among the evils of federalization of the criminal law, the “most
troubling consequence of national uniformity” is that in instances where
concurrent state/federal jurisdiction exists, “[p]rosecutors may choose a
federal forum with the specific purpose of evading state procedural
requirements, particularly in cases in which state police or prosecutors have
violated state procedural rights.”102 In those cases, a difference in the level of
procedural protection afforded by state and federal law creates an unjustified
and unjustifiable procedural disparity gap between state and federal court
defendants that can and must be closed.103

101

Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalism, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029,
1039 n. 42 (1995) (“Thus, the objection apparently is to enacting new federal crimes. This too
is slightly surprising, as it can be argued that rather than the absolute number of federal
crimes, it is the ‘federalization’ of criminal procedure that has occurred since 1960 (via the
‘constitutionalization’ of criminal procedure in the Warren Court and subsequent
congressional legislation such as the 1970 Speedy Trial Act, more detailed Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the 1987 federal Sentencing Guidelines) that has required increased
judicial resources necessarily devoted to criminal cases. While surely significant, these
developments are analytically separate from the number of federal criminal statutes enacted
and could be addressed by procedural changes rather than complete jurisdictional bars to new
federal crimes.”).
102
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 763 (“Though such a federal prosecution may be
preferable to no prosecution at all, the application of a harsher federal sentence under the
circumstances seems less than fair. In effect, the defendant is penalized in federal court
because his state rights were violated. Similarly objectionable would be the application of a
harsh federal sentence in a federal prosecution after an acquittal in state court, which would
penalize the defendant for winning the first time around. Local uniformity would eliminate
such outcomes and help to preserve the integrity of state procedural protections and state
verdicts.’). See also Brickey, supra note 22, at 1164–65 (federal “[p]rosecutors may be
making decisions on the basis of which jurisdiction will put the defendant in the most
disadvantageous position. As noted above, penalties for state drug offenses are relatively light
when compared with their sometimes draconian federal counterparts. Thus, the decision
whether to retain federal jurisdiction or refer the case to the state is critical. Similarly, the
government might choose to retain a case for federal prosecution because of more lenient
federal standards governing the issuance of search warrants, the granting of permission to
engage in electronic surveillance, and the use of informants. Furthermore, it has the tactical
advantages of a nationwide subpoena power, contempt and immunity powers, and forfeiture
authority.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).
103
See United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953, 954 (11th Cir. 1992) (considering
defendant’s contention that his case had been “transferred” to federal court in order to evade
more stringent state standards concerning search warrants, wire surveillance, and informants).
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Even assuming there is a sound constitutional basis for closing this
gap, this article does not make a constitutional “must” argument.104 Although
procedural disparity between the state and federal criminal prosecutions
implicates aspects of judicial comity and federalism, 105 this article does not
make a normative “should” argument for the federal courts to address it.106
Rather, it is Congress’s prerogative and responsibility to address this issue as
a legislative matter to restore a state/federal allocation of responsibility in the
area of criminal law prosecution that has tipped wildly out of balance. This
imbalance undermines the legitimacy of federal law enforcement and
courts. 107 Federalization of the criminal law, furthermore, diverts scarce
resources to the prosecution of criminal acts in federal court that might be
better re-directed to state law enforcement efforts.108
To address this state/federal prosecution disparity, this article
advocates that Congress should enact federal legislation in the form of an
amendment to the Rules Enabling Act requiring federal courts to apply state
criminal procedure in federal prosecutions where application of federal
procedure rules would work a disadvantage to a federal defendant prosecuted
for conduct that could also be prosecuted by the state. Thus, where the
federal and state governments have concurrent jurisdiction over the federal
104

In the sentencing context, federal courts have rejected Equal Protection and
Due Process challenges to state/federal disparities. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 963
F.2d 1337, 1341–42 (10th Cir. 1992) (rejecting due process claim); United States v.
Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1410–11 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Clymer, supra note 33, at 677 n.
181 (citing additional Due Process and Equal Protection cases).
105
Judicial comity/federalism arguments, however, may be worthy of
reconsideration in the post-Booker world. See United States v. Yepez, 652 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.
2011) (under principles of comity federal district court imposing federal sentence could not
consider probationary sentence that had been terminated by state court for purpose of enabling
defendant to become eligible for federal safety valve to mandatory minimum sentence), rev’d
en banc, 704 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012).
106
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“The concept [of comity
represents] a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be
forgotten that this slogan, “Our Federalism,” born in the early struggling days of our Union of
States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.”).
107
United States v. Brennan, 468 F. Supp. 2d 400, 407–08 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“From the point of view of the impact of sentencing on specific and general deterrence and
on reducing recidivism rates, state vertical coordination is more important than nationalhorizontal uniformity. The public and criminals generally consider the local federal and state
courts as part of a single protective institution. Too great a disparity between state and federal
prosecution and sentencing decisions will be seen by the public as creating unjustified
disparities.”).
108
Putting federal defendants on procedural parity with state defendants, at least
with respect to concurrent jurisdiction crimes in states with procedures more favorable to the
accused, I argue, would remove yet another set of incentives (as has been the case to some
extent with striking down the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines) for invoking federal
jurisdiction to prosecute what was traditionally and historically viewed as a state crime in the
U.S. criminal justice system.
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defendant’s conduct and application of a federal procedure will have a
substantive impact in a case, the defendant should be in no worse position
than he or she would have been but for the misfortune or fortuity of ending
up in federal court.
This proposal distinguishes between purely procedural rules, on one
hand, and procedural rules that have substantive impacts, on the other. This
is a distinction often drawn in federal civil practice, which designates purely
procedural matters as the exclusive domain of federal law, even when a
federal court is sitting in diversity, and identifies state substantive law as the
controlling authority when a federal court sits in diversity. 109 As often
recognized, however, simply labeling a rule “procedural” is an incomplete
analysis because procedural rules often have significant substantive
impacts. 110 The disparate impact of the procedure/substantive designation
can be particularly pronounced in the criminal context in instances where
federal procedure does not accurately reflect public policy choices of the
state jurisdiction in which the federal court sits.111
109
If a federal rule is purely procedural it will have no impact, disparate or
otherwise, on federal defendants in concurrent jurisdictions prosecutions. This would include
rules governing filing deadlines, motions practice, and pleading form. These are procedures
that are often controlled by local federal rules, reflecting their character as purely procedural.
However, if a federal rule has potentially substantive effects and/or constitutional dimensions,
procedural equity would require application of its state counterpart.
110
See Olympic Sports Prods., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910,
914 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A] court should note that every procedural rule may, at some point in
litigation, be outcome-determinative[.]”); In re Parr, 165 B.R. 677, 682–83 (Bankr. N.D. Ala,
1993) (“It is obvious that, at times, procedural rules can have substantive, even outcomedeterminative, results[.]”). For an analysis of the unintended and negative consequences of the
Court’s heavy involvement in defining and mandating criminal procedures and of maintaining
a substance/procedure divide in the criminal law see William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (1997)
(characterizing the substance/procedure divide as “less a careful balance than a vicious circle.
Counter majoritarian criminal procedure tends to encourage legislatures to pass overbroad
criminal statutes and to underfund defense counsel. These actions in turn tend to mask the
costs of procedural rules, thereby encouraging courts to make more such rules. That raises
legislatures’ incentive to overcriminalize and underfund. So the circle goes. This is a
necessary consequence of a system with extensive, judicially defined regulation of the
criminal process, coupled with extensive legislative authority over everything else[.]”).
111
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 761–62 (“The federal Constitution, of course,
establishes certain minimum procedural protections that all states must provide to defendants.
As long as these minimal rights are respected, however, each state’s unique procedural policy
choices are entitled to the same degree of deference as its sentencing policy choices. Federal
sentencing practices may undermine these procedural choices. Consider a hypothetical case
arising from an investigation and arrest by state police. Assuming a substantial difference
between state and federal sentences, state law enforcement may prefer a federal prosecution in
order to secure a longer sentence. If federal prosecutors oblige, the defendant faces two
important consequences: the risk of a longer sentence and the loss of state procedural rights,
which may be more extensive than their federal counterparts. Thus, federal sentencing
practices would result in circumvention of the state’s procedural policy choices, without
regard to any particular characteristics of the case that might make federal procedures
especially appropriate.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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This article does not advocate a wholesale importation of state
procedures into all federal concurrent jurisdiction prosecutions. Rather, this
article proposes that federal defendants who are also subject to state court
jurisdiction be afforded the same procedural protection that they would have
received had they been hailed into state court for the same conduct where
application of federal procedure will have substantive effects. Thus, the
default would be application of federal criminal procedure even in
concurrent jurisdiction prosecutions. Only where application of federal
procedure in a concurrent jurisdiction prosecution has substantive impacts
would the federal defendant be entitled to the application of the state
procedure.112
As noted, requiring federal courts to follow uniform federal
procedural rules is neither an historical imperative nor constitutionally
required—before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
federal courts applied the criminal procedure rules of the state in which a
federal court was located and/or a combination of state and federal
procedure. 113 This article proposes returning to this original model in a
discrete and narrow category of federal prosecutions.114 This article submits
that the Rules Enabling Act is the appropriate legislative vehicle for doing
so.
As currently written, the Rules Enabling Act115 allows the Supreme
Court, following certain steps, “to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure . . . for cases in the United States district courts.” 116 A duly
adopted rule that satisfies the Rules Enabling Act supplants any pre-existing
statute. The Act further provides that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.”117 Thus, an act of Congress in the form of
an amendment to the Rules Enabling Act would be required to create and
implement federal rules requiring the application of state procedure in
federal prosecutions where concurrent state/federal jurisdiction exists.
112

This proposition is framed in terms of permitting the federal defendant the
benefit of state criminal procedure in concurrent jurisdiction cases. Assuming an application
of state procedure would benefit the prosecution, rather than the defendant, I would argue for
an across the board application of state procedure, regardless of whether it benefits or
disadvantages the federal defendant. The aim of the proposal in this article is to eliminate
procedural disparity in concurrent jurisdiction cases to put the federal defendant on same
footing as s/he would have been had s/he been prosecuted in state court to vindicate states’
superior claim to regulate substantive outcomes in criminal cases over which it has concurrent
jurisdiction as a federalism principle, not to provide some federal defendants a procedural
windfall.
113
See Taylor, supra note 52, at 847.
114
O’Hear, supra note 23, at 773 (noting that “an across-the-board preference for
national uniformity seems difficult to reconcile with normative theories of federalism,
particularly in the context of routine street crime and other offenses that are primarily local in
character.”).
115
28 U.S.C. § 2072.
116
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
117
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
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To be sure, this proposal is susceptible to criticism that it would
prove unwieldy in practice. Complexity, I believe, is not a legitimate reason
to avoid correcting a disparity so inimical to federalism that subordinates
state choices regarding the appropriate balance between prosecutorial power
and procedural protection of individual defendants in its jurisdiction. Nor do
I accept that federal courts are incapable of applying different bodies of law
in different contexts. With respect to constitutional criminal procedure, since
the Warren Court era, state courts have had to cope with a constantly
evolving, incredibly complex and unpredictable body of federal
constitutional law in resolving federal criminal procedure claims brought in
state court. To argue that federal courts are not equally capable of applying
state criminal procedure is specious. Further, applying state law is a task
federal courts routinely perform in federal civil cases brought in diversity.
The real complexity in the proposal lies not in federal courts’ ability
to apply state procedure, but in distinguishing between rules that regulate
pure procedure and those that have substantive effects. “As the federal courts
have said many times, the specific procedural rules employed can often
dictate substantive results.” 118 This is an issue, of course, that is welldeveloped in the civil law context and one that federal courts are familiar
with and adept at addressing. Although much of the discussion regarding the
procedural/substantive divide has taken place in the civil context, 119 the
concept has been explored in the criminal law as well. 120
This article proposes that criminal cases track this civil diversity
jurisdiction jurisprudence in cases of concurrent jurisdiction. The analogy in
the civil context, of course, is the Erie doctrine,121 which rejected the federal
court practice of applying federal common law rules when sitting in diversity
and mandated that federal courts apply the substantive laws of the states in
which they are located. 122 The Justices in Erie offered a number of
justifications for its rule. However, a dominant concern in Erie, as with the
proposal in this article, was the proper balance between state and federal
authority under in our federal system.123 The argument made here mirrors the
concerns that animated Erie, namely that if rights “vary according to whether
118

Taylor, supra note 52, at 884.
Jay Tidmarsh, Foreword: Erie’s Gift, 44 AKRON. L. REV. 897 (2011)
120
Donald A. Dripps, The Substance-Procedure Relationship in Criminal Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 409, 432 (2011).
121
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. 1 (1842).
122
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
123
Garrick B. Pursley, Defeasible Federalism, 63 ALA. L. REV. 801, 830–31
(2012) (“The Justices in Erie articulated several rationales for the decision, including a
statutory construction holding that the federal Rules of Decision Act requires the application
of state common law in diversity cases absent an applicable federal statutory or regulatory rule
of decision; and a holding apparently based on one of several constitutional rationales
mentioned, including federalism and equal protection concerns. . . . Erie at least states an
indirect federalism rule—whatever the ground for decision was, it was clearly influenced by
federalism considerations.”).
119
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enforcement [is] sought in the state or federal court” equal protection of the
law is rendered impossible.124 Although this is a concept more familiar in the
civil context, mixing state and federal law is not unknown in the criminal
law.125
Under Supreme Court precedent, the test for distinguishing between
substantive and procedural rights is whether a rule “really regulates
procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard
or infraction of them.”126 The Court has resolved this issue not by “reference
to any traditional or common-sense substance-procedure distinction”, but
rather by evaluating whether disregarding a state rule that would control in a
state court will “significantly affect the result of a litigation” in federal
court.127 The inquiry, therefore, “is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s
substantive rights; most procedural rules do.”128 Rather, “[w]hat matters is
what the rule itself regulates . . . ‘the manner and the means’ by which the
litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’” or “‘the rules of decision by which [the]
court will adjudicate [those] rights[.]’”129
The question of what is purely a procedural right is one that has
occupied the Supreme Court for many years in the civil context, most
recently in 2010 in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance
Co. 130 The fault lines and different approaches to the substance versus
procedure analysis that practitioners would need to address in the criminal
context under this article’s proposal are well-illustrated in that case.
In Shady Grove, the defendant insurance company, Allstate, failed to
pay its insured, Shady Grove, interest that had accrued on its policy claim, as

124
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–75, 78 (“Swift ... made rights enjoyed under the unwritten
‘general law’ vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or federal court,”
rendering “impossible the equal protection of the law.”).
125
See, generally, Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal
Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U.L.R. 65 (2006),
126
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
127
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465–66 (1965) (Erie “held that federal courts
sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of ‘substantive’ law, are bound by state
court decisions as well as state statutes. The broad command of Erie was therefore identical to
that of the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law. However, as subsequent cases sharpened the distinction between substance
and procedure, the line of cases following Erie diverged markedly from the line construing the
Enabling Act. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, made it clear that Erie-type problems
were not to be solved by reference to any traditional or common-sense substance-procedure
distinction: ‘And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of
‘procedure’ in some sence [sic]. The question is . . . does it significantly affect the result of a
litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action
upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?’”) (citations omitted).
128
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407
(2010) (plurality) (citing Mississippi Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946)).
129
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (citing Murphree, 326 U.S. at 446)).
130
Id. at 393.
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required by a New York statute.131 Shady Grove filed a class action in federal
court.132 The federal district court held that it lacked diversity jurisdiction
over the claim, because a different state law prohibited actions seeking the
type of remedy that Shady Grove was seeking, and Shady Grove’s individual
claims did not meet the amount-in-controversy threshold even though
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 would have permitted the class action.133
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute prohibiting class
actions in this situation was a “substantive” state law under the Erie doctrine,
required the federal court to apply it to Shady Grove’s diversity claim.134
No single opinion commanded a majority in Shady Grove.135 Three
justices joined an opinion by Justice Scalia reasoning that the Rules Enabling
Act, not Erie, controls the validity of a federal Rule and that, as long as a rule
“really regulates procedure,”136 it is valid under the Enabling Act even if it
incidentally affects a substantive right under state law. According to this
approach, the question is not whether the state law can be characterized as
substantive rather than procedural, but whether a rule is procedural. As
Justice Scalia characterized the question: “[a] class action, no less than
traditional joinder (of which it is a species), merely enables a federal court to
adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits. And
like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and
the rules of decision unchanged.”137
Justice Stevens provided the fifth vote for the Court’s ruling that the
federal court could entertain Shady Grove’s claim under Rule 23,
notwithstanding New York law. He was unwilling to join the plurality’s
analysis and would find a federal rule improper under the Rules Enabling
Act if it displaces a state procedural rule that functions as a part of the state’s
definition of a litigant’s substantive rights and remedies. 138 In Justice
131

Id. at 396–97.
Id.
133
Id. at 397.
134
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137 (2d
Cir. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
135
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined and Justices Stevens
and Sotomayor joined in part. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito joined.
136
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 411.
137
Id. at 408.
138
Id. at 418–19 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Although the Enabling Act and the
Rules of Decision Act ‘say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state “substantive” law
and federal “procedural’ law,” the inquiries are not the same. The Enabling Act does not invite
federal courts to engage in the ‘relatively unguided Erie choice,’ but instead instructs only that
federal rules cannot ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ The Enabling Act’s
limitation does not mean that federal rules cannot displace state policy judgments; it means
only that federal rules cannot displace a State’s definition of its own rights or remedies.
Congress has thus struck a balance: ‘[H]ousekeeping rules for federal courts’ will generally
apply in diversity cases, notwithstanding that some federal rules ‘will inevitably differ’ from
132
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Stevens’ view, New York’s bar against class actions seeking “penalties” was
not a statute that was part of that state’s delineation of substantive rights and
remedies, rather he considered it a purely procedural rule that did not violate
the Rules Enabling Act’s prohibition against rules that abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.
The question in Shady Grove, of course, is not precisely the same
question that would arise under this article’s proposal. Depending on which
opinion in Shady Grove framed the issue, the question was whether the
federal rule at issue violated the Rules Enabling Act because it regulated
more than procedure (plurality), or whether the state law displaced by federal
rule at issue was substantive (Stevens).139 This article proposes that Congress
amend the Rules Enabling Act to direct federal courts to apply state
procedure in concurrent jurisdiction cases where application of a procedural
rule may affect the result of a criminal prosecution in federal court. To the
extent that federal courts would be called on to distinguish between purely
procedural rules, on one hand, and rules that alter the substantive rights of
litigants in this context, however, Shady Grove and its predecessors will
provide the road map for this analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where a federal defendant is prosecuted for conduct over which a
state also has criminal jurisdiction this may result in an indefensible
procedural disparity in a federal system that purports to defer to the
supremacy of the states in matters of distinctly local concern. Ignoring this
procedural disparity undermines federalism, unjustifiably disadvantages
persons over whom the state has a superior claim to bring to justice, and
encourages forum shopping, all with no discernable benefit to either the
state rules. But not every federal ‘rul[e] of practice or procedure,’ will displace state law. To
the contrary, federal rules must be interpreted with some degree of ‘sensitivity to important
state interests and regulatory policies,’ and applied to diversity cases against the background
of Congress’ command that such rules not alter substantive rights and with consideration of
‘the degree to which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray
from the course it would follow in state courts,’ This can be a tricky balance to implement.”)
(citations omitted).
139
Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410–11 (plurality) (“A few words in response to the
concurrence. We understand it to accept the framework we apply—which requires first,
determining whether the federal and state rules can be reconciled (because they answer
different questions), and second, if they cannot, determining whether the Federal Rule runs
afoul of § 2072(b). The concurrence agrees with us that Rule 23 and § 901(b) conflict, and
departs from us only with respect to the second part of the test, i.e., whether application of the
Federal Rule violates § 2072(b). Like us, it answers no, but for a reason different from ours.
The concurrence would decide this case on the basis, not that Rule 23 is procedural, but that
the state law it displaces is procedural, in the sense that it does not ‘function as a part of the
State’s definition of substantive rights and remedies.’ A state procedural rule is not preempted,
according to the concurrence, so long as it is ‘so bound up with,’ or ‘sufficiently intertwined
with,’ a substantive state-law right or remedy ‘that it defines the scope of that substantive right
or remedy[.]’”) (internal citations omitted).
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federal or the state criminal justice systems. To address this inverted
Mississippi Problem, this article proposes federal legislation requiring
federal courts to apply state procedure in concurrent jurisdiction prosecutions
where there application of state procedure will have substantive impacts in
the prosecution.
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